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MILITARY RESERVATIONS: FORTS OR PARKS?
ROBERT GERWIG*
Military reservations in the United States customarily display warn-
ing notices at the entrance reading "This is a U.S. Military Reservation,"
or words to that effect. Today's visitor approaching the site in a motor
vehicle is not apt to notice such indications, particularly if he should
be waved in by a soldier posted at the gate. Absent evidence of sus-
picious motives, his passage is not likely to be barred.'
Does this apparent open gate policy suggest that visitors are free to
roam at will into and within the military post, and to disport themselves
as they might in a public park? Are the premises open to demonstrators
who, in the contemporary mode, desire to convey a dramatic message to
the authorities? May leaflets and their equivalent be distributed within
the gates? Has the concept of strict control over entry onto military
bases been replaced by newer notions of free access? May military
personnel assigned to the post carry on demonstrations, disseminate
printed materials, or hold provocative group meetings, without approval
of the commander?
As in many cases of governmental and institutional activity, the
traditional power of a military commander over his post has come
under attack by those who question established authority. Issues which
formerly were regarded as nonjusticiable because of a strong disinclina-
tion by the judiciary to intervene in military affairs,2 are now being
*B.B.A., University of Georgia; LL.B., Atlanta Law School; LL.M., John Marshall
Law School. Attorney, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, Fort McPherson, Georgia.
1. Frequently, in the absence of special arrangements by the post commander,
stringent troop requirements elsewhere result in unmanned gates at military stations.
2. E.g., Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953) ("Orderly government requires
that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to interfere with legitimate Army matters as
the Army must be scrupulous not to intervene in judicial matters."); Harper v. Jones,
195 F.2d 705, 707 (10th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 821 (1952) ("What is neces-
sary for the discipline of military personnel and to safeguard their health and welfare
is to be determined by the commanding officers and not the courts."). In contrast
to litigation merely testing a commander's authority over his post, note a suit by a
professor of constitutional law (as a citizen and taxpayer) against the President to
declare the military conflict in Viet Nam unconstitutional, dismissed on the ground
that the appellant lacked standing to sue. Velvel v. Johnson, 287 F. Supp. 846 (D. Kans.
1968), aff'd sub nont. Velvel v. Nixon, 415 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1969). Though perhaps
not understood by the public, the Army has historically recognized the right of appeal
within the military. See, e.g., Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 138, 10 US.C.
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tested in an effort to establish a new area of confrontation with au-
thority. Under these circumstances, a brief survey of traditional prece-
dents and recent cases asserting new theories of entry to military bases
may bring into focus acceptable limits of the commander's authority
vis-a-vis those who would enter or use the premises for purposes not
normally related to the post's mission.
THE MILITARY Posr IN TRADITIONAL Focus
Historical Perspective
In the mid-nineteenth century, the Secretary of War requested ad-
vice from the Attorney General concerning the report of a junior Army
officer attesting that representatives of a railway company had trespassed
on federal lands adjoining a military post and suggesting retaliatory
action by injunction or otherwise. In his brisk reply, Attorney Gen-
eral J. S. Black stated that:
It was the practice of the Federal Government in early times to
vindicate her right to the possession of the public property in a
very short way. She turned out and kept out all lawless intruders,
without stopping to ask leave of the courts. I do not know at
what precise period she became humble enough to forego the
privilege of self defense, or when she began to prefer the shelter
of an injunction to the protection of her own right hand. In
theory, she still denies her liability to be sued; but in practice
that theory comes to very little, if any man or corporation who
is impudent enough to invade her property, can compel her to
abandon it, and get the decree of a court before she can retake it.
If that be the rule, her immunity from law suits amounts to this:
that she will not allow herself to be sued by an honest person who
has a just claim, and seeks to enforce it in a legal way; but she will
let any trespasser deprive her of her rights, and drive her into
court to regain them.
S 939 (1964); W. WINTHROP, MrLITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 604 (2d ed. 1920) quoting
the remarks of General Auguy as long ago as 1884:
The right of appeal from an immediate commander to a superior one is
the right of every officer or soldier in the Army, and ought to be maintained
untrammelled by fear of any resentment on the part of the officer whose
acts or decisions are thus either expressly or impliedly questioned. To throw
any impediment in the way of such appeal or to visit its exercise with
confinement or threat of punishment, in the opinion of the commanding
general, does violence alike to discipline, justice, and good order in the
Army.
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Here, you tell me, is a railway corporation which has crossed
over from Canada, and threatens to take possession of the land of
the United States. If they can take a part of that property, they
can take it all, or any other military station, dismantle the fort,
turn out the garrison, and tear down the house where the com-
mander has his quarters. The threat is, that they will thrust them-
selves on the public property by a naked, downright, and palpable
wrong, with nothing to avouch the deed but their own mere will.
It is not my opinion that any injunction is needed to prevent such
afi outrage. A few words of instruction to the officers of the army
at Fort Porter, or near it, will be amply sufficient.3
A few years later, Mr. Black responded to a similar request by the Secre-
tary to furnish advice to a subordinate Army commander concerning
trespassers on a military facility. As to the right of the commander to
protect a military post by force from occupation or injury at the hands
of trespassers, he stated that "[It] here can be no doubt upon this point,"
although he cautioned against unnecessary or wanton harm to persons
or property.4
In an opinion relating to the rights of residents and visitors of the
United States Military Academy, an earlier Attorney General, Benjamin
F. Butler, stated:
• . . It is obvious that, when persons in civil life who may be
allowed to reside at or to resort to the post, obstruct the professors
or their officers in the performance of their appropriate duties; or
interfere with the studies or discipline of the academy; or en-
courage the cadets in acts of insubordination; or enter into cor-
respondence with them, contrary to the regulation, their further
presence at the post will become, according to the nature of the
circumstances and the degree of aggravation, more or less injuri-
ous to the institution; and that, in flagrant cases of this sort, the
prompt removal of the offenders may be indispensable. As they
will not be amenable to a court-martial, there is no other way in
which the ill consequences which might otherwise result from
such misconduct can be prevented. In the exercise of a sound dis-
cretion, the commandant of the post may, therefore, order from it
any person not attached to it by law, whose presence is, in his
judgment, injurious to the interests of the academy. And, in case
any person so ordered shall refuse to depart, after reasonable
3. 90p. Ar'y GEN. 106, 107 (1857).
4. 9 Op. ATr'y GEN. 476 (1860).
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notice, and within a reasonable time, having regard to the circum-
stances of the case, I think the superintendent may lawfully re-
move him by force. . ..
Attorney General Butler's response, together with the views of his suc-
cessor, Mr. Black, furnish a valuable historical background for a con-
sideration of the traditional authority of a post commander to exclude
from a military reservation those whose presence is either detrimental
to or incompatible with the basic military mission.
Command of a military installation or activity (e.g., fort, camp, base,
depot, arsenal) is normally the responsibility of the senior assigned officer.
Such command is somewhat different from the unique disciplinary au-
thority of an officer over troops in his charge and, for the purposes of
this discussion, refers more particularly to the post commander's respon-
sibility as a general manager of land, buildings and equipment, personnel,
and related activities. In this capacity, his function is analogous to that
of the superintendent of a large commercial plant or facility, or that of
the governing official of a city.6 Early opinions of the Judge Advocate
General of the Army contained no reservations concerning the legality
of removing trespassers by force if necessary.7 The typical opinion de-
clared that "[a] Post commander can, in his discretion, exclude all per-
sons other than those belonging to his post from post and reservation
grounds but should he admit everybody except one individual against
whom no charge of wrongdoing existed, such action would be con-
sidered an abuse of discretion on the part of the post commander." 8
Although the opinions generally refer to the authority of a post com-
mander, more precisely it is the general constitutional power of the
President, as Commander in Chief of the Army,' that manifestly de-
volves upon the post commander. This power commonly may be re-
flected through appropriate departmental regulations or equivalent di-
5. 3 Op. ATr'y GEN. 268, 272 (1837). Notable is the contemporary thrust of the
rationale to certain aspects of the campus unrest problem.
6. DEP'T op a A.RMy PAMPHLET 27-164, para. 10.1 (1965). The context is generally
broad enough to include officers in charge of Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast
Guard, and similar facilities.
7. See DIGaSr oF OPINIONS OF THE JDGE-ADvocATES GENERAL OF THE ARMY, paras.
1700, 1704, 1713-15, 1717 (1901).
8. Id. at card 2682 (Oct. 1896).
9. U.S. CONST. art. 1IL § 2: "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the
Army.... ."
[Vol. 12:51
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rectives.10 In 1909, and by subsequent re-enactment, the Congress ex-
pressly recognized and reinforced the post commander's inherent police
power over military sites. Punishment consisting of a fine up to $500,
or imprisonment not exceeding six months, or both were authorized for
anyone within the jurisdiction of the United States who either:
a. Goes upon any military reservation or installation "for any
purpose prohibited by law or lawful regulations;" or
b. Re-enters such reservation or installation "after having been
removed therefrom or ordered not to re-enter by any officer
or person in command or charge thereof. . . . "I'
Legislative sanction for the commander to control access to a post was
also provided to include situations where security or protection of gov-
ernment property was the predominant interest."2 For example, the
Judge Advocate General of the Army has issued opinions supporting
the inherent power of post commanders to order the removal of a sol-
dier's wife for sufficient cause,' 3 and to exclude civilians regardless of
the extent of jurisdiction reserved by the state.' 4 Other opinions empha-
10. The rationale supporting a presumption that, under appropriate circumstances,
an official acts by authority of the President is succinctly recited in Dunmar v. Ailes,
348 F.2d 51, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
11. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 45, 35 Star. 1097, as amended Act of March 28,
1940, 54 Stat. 80, re-eracted 18 U.S.C. 1382 (1964). Cases upholding convictions in-
clude: United States v. Jelinski, 411 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1969); Weissman v. United
States, 387 F.2d 271 (10th Cir. 1967); Holdridge v. United States, 282 F.2d 302 (8th
'Cir. 1960); United States v. Packard, 236 F. Supp. 595 (N.D. Cal. 1964), aff'd, 339 F.2d
887 (9th Cir. 1964). Illustrative cases not upholding conviction include: United States v.
Bradley, 418 F.2d 688 (4th Cir. 1969); United States v. Ramirez Seijo, 281 F. Supp.
708 (D. P.R. 1968); United States v. Watson, 80 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Va. 1948).
12. Internal Security Act of 1950, § 21(a), 50 U.S.C. § 797(a) (1964) authorizes, in
the case of conviction of willful violation of directives issued by the Secretary of
Defense or designated commanders, a fine not to exceed $5000 or imprisonment for not
more than one year, or both.
13. DiGrsr oF OPINioNs, supra note 7, at card 25177 (1912). An interesting recent
example of the breadth of the commander's authority over his military personnel is
Hines v. Seaman, 305 F. Supp. 564 (D. Mass. 1969). After warning a sergeant (per-
mitted to live on post with his family) that if he did not control the behavior of a
dependent son who had committed several thefts he might have to leave base housing,
and upon evidence that the son had subsequently been arrested for molesting two
girls on post, the post commander notified him that he must vacate the quarters. The
court determined that the sergeant was a licensee and not a tenant, and therefore not
entitled to judicial intervention to prevent eviction.
14. SPJGA 1946/3760, 5 BuLL. JAG 181 (May 23, 1946).
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sized that the authority of a commander to exclude civilians was a pro-
prietorial right not dependent upon legislative jurisdiction.' 5
For many years, Army regulations explicitly directed post com-
manders to use force, if necessary, to remove trespassers.16 Under cur-
rent regulations enacted pursuant to statute, 17 a post commander is re-
sponsible, inter alia, to accomplish his mission, to care for his personnel
and property,' to maintain law and order at the installation, 9 and to
establish appropriate rules governing the entry and exit of all persons.2°
In addition, he is charged with regulating post vehicular traffic,2 ' fire-
arms,2 solicitors,23 and other visitors, including those invited for social
occasions or activities open to the public in general.24
Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy25
In 1961, the Supreme Court examined the scope of a commander's in-
herent authority over a military installation in the appeal of a Navy
cafeteria worker who had been refused permission to enter the Navy
premises. The worker had failed to meet the security requirements of
the installation and subsequently had been denied a hearing to consider
the effect of the exclusion upon her employment at the site. The Court
responded to two basic questions: Was the commander authorized to
15. See, e.g., DEP'T op THE ARMY PAMPHLET 27-164, para. 10.3 (1965). Much real
property under government ownership is not subject to federal "legislative jurisdiction,"
which term refers to authority-normally exercised by a state-to legislate within such
areas. Id. at para. 4-1.
16. Army Regulations, para. 212 (1913) [hereinafter cited as AR].
17. E.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 3061, 3012(g) (1964), authorize the President and Secretary
of the Army, respectively, to prescribe regulations. Note also the constitutional grant
of authority for the Congress 'To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of
the land and naval Forces ... ." U.S. Co-sr. art. 1, § 8.
18. AR 600-20, para. 10 (Jan. 31, 1967).
19. AR 210-10, para. 1-13 (Sept. 30, 1968).
20. 32 C.F.R. § 552.18 (1970); AR 210-10, para. 1-15 (rev. March 10, 1969). See also
AR 633-1, para. 8c (Sept. 13, 1962) which expressly authorizes ejection of persons
not subject to military law who commit a breach of regulations.
21. AR 210-10, para. 1-16 (Sept. 30, 1968).
22. Id, para. 1-17.
23. AR 210-7 (Feb. 11, 1970).
24. AR 380-25 (May 17, 1965).
25. 367 U.S. 896 (1961). The installation involved was the Naval Gun Factory,
Washington, D.C. The Court considered at some length the line of authority from
the President and the Congress to the Navy Regulations, and their local implementation.
The sweeping force of the Court's decision, however, and its reference to Army
administrative determinations, and subsequent reliance on this decision by other courts
in analogous cases preclude doubt of its general application to all of the armed services.
[Vol. 12:51
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deny employees access to the installation in the manner chosen? If so,
did such action deprive her of any constitutional rights?
On the first issue, the Navy's regulations governing the traditional
responsibilities and duties of a commanding officer concerning the ad-
mittance of dealers, tradesmen, or their agents, in the Court's view, re-
flected "unquestioned authority which commanding officers of mili-
tary installations have exercised throughout our history." 20 In con-
sidering whether summary denial of access to the site of her former
employment violated the employee's rights under the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment, the Court was satisfied that a hearing at which
she might refute the specific grounds for her exclusion from the site
was not constitutionally required. In so deciding, the Court applied the
traditional formula which requires consideration of the precise nature of
the governmental function vis-a'-vis the private interest affected. In this
case, the governmental function to manage the internal operation of a
federal military installation was determined to be paramount to the
abridgment of a citizen's privilege to work at that installation.
CuRRET PROBLEMS AND THEIR DIsPosITION
Cafeteria Workers broadly outlines the fundamental authority of the
commander to deny individuals access to his post. It may be useful,
however, to fill in the basic framework with subsequent judicial views
concerning special aspects of the over-all authority, particularly in the
light of recent re-examination of the issues thought to have been settled
in 1961. For example, mere entry upon a federal station has been stated
to be not malum in se and becomes an offense under federal law only
when a statute or lawful regulation prohibits entry without permission.
The exclusionary order may be justified, however, "in the interest of
good order and military discipline," as in the Cafeteria Workers case.
Reasonable requirements of orderly government dictate that persons
who enter upon a military reservation surrender some of their constitu-
26. Id. at 892. The Court cited 3 Op. Arr'y GnN. 268, 269 (1837) for the proposition
that "'citizens resident within the public limits ... even though they own houses on
the public grounds or occupy buildings belonging to the United States [are regarded]
as tenants at 'will. . . '" 367 U.S. at 893 (emphasis added). Various Judge Advocate
General views were also cited including JAGA 1925/680.44 (Oct. 6, 1925) .which
supports a post commander's discretion to "'exclude private persons and property...
or admit them under such restrictions as he may prescribe in the interest of good
order and military discipline... :." 367 U.S. at 893.
27. United States v. Bishop, 261 F. Supp. 969, 971 (ND. Cal. 1966), a prosecution
for violation of a post regulation prohibiting entry without prior permission.
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tional rights so that military discipline and security may remain invio-
late.28 Regarding a post commander's acknowledged responsibility
for maintaining order on a post, the courts have ruled that he may bar
re-entry of persons to forestall actions of a disruptive nature. This
action is to be based upon his reasonable belief that such a consequence
may follow their entry upon the premises. 29 Under the Cafeteria Work-
ers rationale, prohibition of re-entry would not be subject to prior
notice or hearing 0 Once having been barred for any legitimate reason
within the scope of the post commander's police power, an individual's
motive for re-entry becomes immaterial.8 1
As the threat of anti-war demonstrations increased, the Judge Advo-
cate General of the Army suggested that post commanders issue reg-
ulations prohibiting activities such as on-post "picketing, demonstrations,
sit-ins, protest marches, political speeches, and similar activities," except
as approved in specific instances upon prior submission of a request
thereforaa Mindful that anti-war manifestations might also take the
form of distribution of printed materials, the Judge Advocate General
issued guidance for commanders to control distribution of pamphlets,
handbills, and flyers.'
28. United States v. Miller, 261 F. Supp. 442, 449 (D. Del. 1966), permitting admis-
sion of evidence obtained on a military reservation in connection with arrest thereon
for possession of a stolen car in violation of the Dyer Act.
29. Weissman v. United States, 387 F.2d 271 (10th Cir. 1967), affirming conviction
under 18 U.S.C. § 1382 (1964), and thus sustaining as "rational" and "reasonable"
the post commander's order barring twro persons from re-entering Fort Sill because of
a prior "unseemly demonstration" at a court-martial.
30. For a recent application of this rationale see United States v. Jelinsli, 411 F.2d
476 (5th Cir. 1969).
31. Holdridge v. United States, 282 F.2d 302 (8th Cir. 1960), affirming the convic-
tion of an individual for re-entry motivated by religious beliefs about the immorality
of war.
32. 67-13 Judge Advocate Legal Service 9 (June 14, 1967) [hereinafter cited as
JALS]; see also, Letter, Dep't of the Army, JAGL-X, October 15 Peace Demonstrations
(Oct. 7, 1969), issued in response to impending "peace" demonstrations, in which
the Judge Advocate General of the Army stated:
It is our view that, providing he treats all similarly situated persons
equally, a post commander has an absolute right to exclude civilians from
his installation and that he may place restrictions upon their entrance and
activities on his post. In particular, a post commander may exclude ac-
tivities which he deems detrimental to morale and good order and disci-
pline on his installation. We believe it is reasonable for him to exclude
persons who admittedly wish to convince others, and particularly his
soldiers, to resist the established military policy of the United States....
33. JAGA, 1 November 1968, 68-26 JALS 13. Subsequent opinions suggested the
addition of newspapers, magazines, other printed material, and circulation of petitions
[Vol. 12:51
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Early in 1969, the Department of the Army announced a policy
governing on-post distribution of publications. 34 Installation command-
ers were to be guided by the principle that troops are as entitled to free
access to publications, even if in poor taste or unfairly critical of gov-
ernment policies or officials, as are other citizens. This policy, however,
was subject to certain conditions under which a post commander might
prohibit distribution of publications which were disseminated through
other than regularly established and approved outlets, such as military
libraries and exchanges, unless prior approval was given. The Judge
Advocate General warned that such prohibitions could be justified
only by the application of reasonable standards. Standards such as "good
taste" and "best interests of the command" were regarded to be of
doubtful validity and likely to invite legal challenge. Defensible stand-
ards, on the other hand, which would support prohibition of distribu-
tion of publications on post include a reasonable belief that the publi-
cation:
a. Would prevent or materially interfere with the military mis-
sion;
b. Was obscene or pornographic; or
c. Was one whose distribution would be unlawful (e.g., activi-
ties detrimental to the armed forces, as proscribed by specific
statutes); or would otherwise constitute a clear danger to mili-
tary loyalty, discipline, or the morale of the military personnel
at the installation.35
In May of 1969, the Department of the Army established additional
guidelines in a letter entitled "Guidance on Dissent," 36 the essence of
which was incorporated in a subsequent Department of Defense re-
lease.37 Concerning on-post demonstrations and similar activities, the
directive substantially employed the language previously suggested by
the Judge Advocate General of the Army in connection with the distri-
bution of publications:
for signatures. JAGA 1969/3715 (April 2, 1969), 69-9 JALS 15, and JAGA 1969/4942
(Jan. 8, 1970), 70-1 JALS 27.
34. Dep't of the Army message 894727 (Jan. 24, 1969) published in AR 210-10,
para. 5-5 (March 10, 1969).
35. JAGA 1969/3715 (April 2, 1969), 69-9 JALS 15.
36. The Adjutant General, Dep't of the Army letter, Guidance on Dissent (May 28,
1969).
37. Dep't of Defense Directive 1325.6, Guidelines for Handling Dissident and Protest
Activities Among Members of the Armed Forces, (Sept. 12, 1969).
19701
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The Commander of a military installation shall prohibit any
demonstraton or activity on the installation which could result in
interference with or prevention of orderly accomplishment of the
mission of the installation, or present a clear danger to loyalty,
discipline, or morale of the troops.
The directive cited 18 U.S.C. § 1382 to emphasize that it is a crime for
any person to enter a military reservation for any purpose prohibited by
law or lawful regulations, or to enter or re-enter any installation after
having been barred by order of the commander. By way of illustrating
the effect of such a directive prohibiting on-post demonstrations or dis-
tribution of publications, an analogous situation arose involving the
application of a General Services Administration rule prohibiting un-
seemly or disorderly conduct on GSA property. As judicially inter-
preted on review, this rule did not deny fair warning to defendants
whose behavior allegedly interfered with the official business of an
armed forces examining and entrance station.5
The recent case of Kiiskila v. Nichols3 9 bears a striking resemblance
to Cafeteria Workers. The commanding officer at Fort Sheridan issued
an order forbidding an employee's re-entry which resulted in the termi-
nation of her employment. The order was based on the commander's
belief that the worker intended to distribute anti-war literature on the
base.40 A substantial supply of literature had been found in her car on
post after she had, on the same day, distributed such material in the
vicinity of another military installation. The officer reasoned that her
continued presence would be prejudicial to good order and discipline
and adversely affect the accomplishment of the commander's mission.
The plaintiff sought an injunction to bar the commander from inter-
fering with her employment on post. The rule of Cafeteria Workers,
however, defeated the argument that her First Amendment right of
free speech had been violated. A summary judgment for the govern-
ment was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals which relied
on the commander's responsibility to protect his command against the
threat of anti-military expressions which would interfere with his mili-
tary mission.
38. United States v. Akeson, 290 F. Supp. 212 (D. Col. 1968). Similar regulations
were also deemed not to be unconstitutionally vague or overly broad in United
States v. Sroka, 307 F. Supp. 400 (E.D. Wis. 1969) (denying a motion to dismiss
information charging unwarranted loitering and assembly in a federal building).
39. - F.2d - (7th Cir. 1970), 38 U.S.L.W. 2450 (7th Cir. Feb. 4, 1970).
40. Post regulations barred demonstrations and similar activities.
[Vol. 12.51
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Occasionally ambiguities in regulations, or omissions therefrom may
cause serious problems in the event of litigation. By way of illustration,
a. post commander issued the standard prohibition against picketing,
demonstrations, sit-ins, protest marches, political speeches and similar
activities.41 He then applied the "similar activities" portion to university
students who distributed anti-war and free-speech pamphlets on post.
The district court perceived no difficulty in including the questioned act
under the regulation and upheld, without extended comment, a convic-
tion under 18 U.S.C. § 1382.42 The circuit court reversed in United
States v. Bradley42 on the ground that the specified activities in the ap-
plicable regulation pertained to expressions overtly displayed and pro-
claimed-demonstrative activities, such as parading, singing and display
of placards44-and not to pure dissemination of information, unaccom-
panied by fanfare. The reversal was based upon a failure of the gov-
ernment to show that "disruption, confusion or inconvenience" accom-
panied the students' activities.45
In Dash v. Commanding General,46 the court considered a number of
issues raised, not by civilians, but by ten soldiers, in a petition filed on
behalf of all post enlisted personnel. The petitioners sought a ruling on
their constitutional rights of free speech insofar as they were allegedly
abridged by:
a. A regulation of the post commander restricting on-post dis-
tribution of published materials; 47 and
b. Refusal of the post commander to grant the plaintiffs' petition
for an open meeting on base for free discussion of the Viet
Nam war and other related matters.
41. See note 32, supra.
42. The conviction was for being present on a military post in violation of a lawful
regulation.
43. 418 F.2d 688 (4th Cir. 1969).
44. The court did not undertake to distinguish between a quiet display of placards
and an equally quiet distribution of leaflets. Id.
45. The court expressly declined to comment on the constitutionality of the post
regulation, and also did not preclude conviction, in a proper case, where proof
connected distribution with a "mass demonstration." Id. at 689. Prior to the decision,
but subsequent to the incident involved, the post filled the void in its regulation by
issuing the customary bar against distribution of publications. See note 33, supra.
46. 307 F. Supp. 849 (D. S.C. 1969).
47. The regulation incorporated the customary military prohibition against distribu-
tion of publications, including pamphlets, handbills and flyers (except through regularly
established outlets) without prior approval.
1970]
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Some threshold considerations are of interest. Although each plaintiff
had been released by the Army or transferred to another base, the court
denied the government's contention of mootness. The court's theory
was that the issues were continuing, since they involved restraints on
all personnel at the base. The court refused to permit its power to be
destroyed by the military through release or transfer of personnel. The
defendant also urged application of the exhaustion of remedies doctrine,
but the court found that further administrative action by the plaintiffs
would be ineffective under the circumstances. The court noted that
the right of free speech is not absolute; the issue always involves a
balance between competing private and public interests in the particular
circumstances. 8 This is especially true in the military community,4
where the need for discipline, with the attendant impairment of certain
individual rights, is significant." In reviewing military decisions, the
courts must accommodate the demand of individual rights and the social
order in a context which is far removed from those encountered in
ordinary civilian litigation, and they must interpret a legal tradition
which is radically different from that which is common in civil courts. 51
Concerning the regulation controlling distribution of literature, the
court stated that the constitutionality of the provision must be deter-
mined by the regulation as construed and defined in the Judge Advo-
cate General's instructions controlling its application.52 In this case the
court found no constitutional impediment in the regulation per se, but
cautioned that whether a commander has properly exercised his power
in a particular situation is an issue that must be resolved on a case by case
basis. The court relied, in part, on recognition by the Supreme Court in
Cafeteria Workers of the commander's authority to enforce good order
and military discipline.
48. The court cited Callison v. United States, 413 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1969), in which
that court indicated that an inductee was not free to incite and solicit others present
at the induction station to join with him in an expression of opposition to the very
process in which they were involved. Cf. Meehan v. Macy, 392 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir.
1968), in which the court discussed limits of propriety for acceptable behavior of
civilian employees of the government in an action challenging the validity of a dis-
charge for printing and distributing an intemperate, contemptuous, and defamatory
lampoon of a high government official.
49. See Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953), and In re Grinley, 137 U.S.
147 (1890).
50. See Raderman v. Kaine, 411 F.2d 1102, 1104 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
976 (1969), in which the court held that what constitutes neat and soldierly ap-
pearance for a reservist under Army regulations was for the military to decide.
51. See Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683, 694 (1969).
52. See note 35, supra.
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The court dealt with the issue of public meetings on post in similar
terms. Though the plaintiffs asserted that the purpose of the particular
meeting desired was to peacefully discuss the justification for the Viet
Nam engagement, the court believed that it was indisputable that such
a meeting, held on post and directed particularly to servicemen being
trained to participate in that war, would breed discontent and weaken
loyalty. The court also distinguished the college campus from a military
training base, pointing out that authority allegedly sustaining First
Amendment rights of students is not applicable to the determination of
the rights of servicemen on base. 3 Accordingly it granted the govern-
ment's motion for summary judgment."'
The government's motion to dismiss was summarily granted in two
other recent cases. The first case55 arose at Fort Knox when the plain-
tiff went on the post to distribute leaflets advertising an off-post "Teach-
in, Speak-out" at which servicemen would be given a chance to express
their views "about the Army, as it really is, and about Army racism."
While distributing the leaflets, plaintiff was arrested by the Military
Police, was finger-printed, photographed, held in custody for about two
hours, and was then presented with a letter ordering him to leave the
premises and not to re-enter without permission, under penalty of
prosecution. Plaintiff complained that his treatment abridged his con-
stitutional rights. He requested an injunction prohibiting enforcement
of the order denying access to the post and interference with distribution
of leaflets. The court sustained the government's motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction. A similar ruling was given in a case arising at Fort
53. As to the plaintiffs' assertion concerning college campus rights, the law is not
altogether as claimed, see, e.g., Norton v. East Tenn. State Discipline Committee,
419 F.2d 195 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 906 (1970), affirming a district court's
-denial of relief for alleged deprivation of constitutional rights, and upholding the claim
of institutional administrators that they have inherent authority to discipline students
whose actions (including distribution of inflammatory leaflets) threaten to disrupt school
activities.
54. Although Dash may be thought to conflict with Bradley, the cases are easily
distinguishable. The latter denied the commander's power to bar distribution of publi-
cations on post only because it was found that he sought to exercise power pursuant
to a regulation generally dealing with disruptive demonstrative acts, which the
court believed did not reach peaceful dissemination of leaflets. For a recent considera-
tion of constitutional limitation on free expression by public employees in another
context, see Murphy v. Facendia, 307 F. Supp. 353 (D. Colo. 1969) (denying relief
to VISTA employees who used government facilities to discuss and draft an anti-war
resolution which, in the view of the court, detracted time and effort from their
primary work, "promoted dissension between volunteers and their superiors, and
generally interfered with the regular operation of VISTA").
55. Goldsmith v. Sutherland, - F. Supp. - (W.D. Ky. 1969).
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Dix." In this instance, plaintiffs57 complained that they were denied
permission to hold a protest march and rally on post, in the vicinity of
the stockade, and to distribute literature. Prominent among their claims
was the contention that the post was open to the public, since several
public highways ran through it. An application for an order to show
cause and the issuance of a temporary restraining order was denied by
the court and it dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
A PERSPECTIVE
These cases represent the present status of the law and should be
placed in proper perspective, although it is patent that subsequent events
may affect the prevailing view. It is quite probable that Bradley would
not have been heard by a court when the early Attorneys General were
advising the Secretary of War that there was no doubt that the com-
mander of a post might, at his discretion, order from it any person whose
presence was, in his judgment, injurious to the interests of the military;
indeed that a few words of instruction to the officers concerned would
be sufficient to clear military areas of trespassers. By 1969, however,
the Secretary of Defense was willing to impose limitations upon the
discretionary authority of installation commanders to prohibit distribu-
tion of publications, through other than official outlets, and demonstra-
tions. Only when such activities would result in clear danger to the
loyalty, discipline, or morale of his troops, or materially interfere with
the accomplishment of a military mission might the commander exercise
his authority.5"
Bradley makes clear, at least in the view of the fourth circuit, that a
commander may not repress distribution of publications by use of a
local regulation designed to control disruptive behavior such as demon-
strations and protest marches.59 Under the rationale of Dash, however,
56. The Committee to Free the Fort Dix 38 v. Collins, - F. Supp. - (D. N.J.
1969), appeal dismissed, 429 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1970). In still another case originally in-
volving commanders of Army, Navy, and Marine Corps units, the court considered
whether the commanders were constitutionally authorized to bar certain ministers from
military installations in Hawaii. The court declined to review what it considered to be
highly important military administrative decisions, and dismissed the complaints. Bridges
v. Davis, 311 F. Supp. 935 (D. Hawaii 1969).
57. The plaintiffs were civilians assertedly unhappy with the administration and
treatment of 38 military prisoners at the stockade.
58. According to the Judge Advocate General of the Army, distribution of publica-
tions can also be barred if the activity violates specific federal statutes, or if the
material circulated is pornographic. See JAGA 1969/3715 (April 2, 1969), 69-9 JALS 15.
59. The commander's authority to bar publications in accordance with regulations
and application of appropriate standards has not been denied in any reported case.
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a commander may legitimately forbid an open meeting or distribution
of materials, when either may reasonably be expected to generate criti-
cism of, and resistance to government policy, or otherwise impede the
accomplishment of the post mission. A military reservation frequendy
constitutes an enclave, isolated from the surrounding civilian commun-
ity, without major thoroughfares by which non-military traffic may
pass. Such conditions permit a commander considerable latitude in
restricting entry to the post. When, however, major traffic arteries
traverse a reservation, 0 he may not bar traffic through his post. This
limitation upon his authority exists for the purpose of accommodating
bona fide travelers. Finally, with due regard for the established au-
thority of a post commander over those within his military control, he
represents but one echelon in the hierarchy of the national defense
establishment. If the traditional exhaustion of remedies doctrine is sig-
nificant in determining the maturity of a case for judicial review, 1 it
would seem to be particularly appropriate to require a complainant to
follow the normal administrative avenues of redress when challenging
the power of a post commander before burdening the judicial process.
Where are we with respect to the commander's authority to protect
his post from dissident acts? Is his post a fort in the traditional sense,
where military interests exclude any incompatible intrusion at the dis-
cretion of the commander? Or is it, as suggested by some advocates,
no more than a government park, freely available for popular use as a
meeting place, even for the purpose of airing righteous indignation or
criticism of the government? 2 With deference to distinguishing factors
60. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 80 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Va. 1948). The reserva-
tion road provided the only public access between an abutting town and the major
highway. In any event, when government property is open to the public in general,
reasonable, non-discriminatory regulation is appropriate to prevent interference with
designated and intended governmental use. United States v. Cassiagnol, 420 F.2d 868
(4th Cir. 1970) (arising out of antiwar demonstration at the Pentagon in Arlington
County, Virginia); Massachusetts Welfare Rights Organization v. Ott, 421 F.2d 525
(1st Cir. 1969) (suit attacking constitutionality of a state regulation suspending welfare
services affected by demonstrations and disturbances). Mr. Justice Black noted the
distinction between governmental facilities and public streets in his dissenting opinion
in Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 157 (1966); see Note, Regulation of Demonstra-
tions, 80 HARV. L. Rzv. 1773, 1776-77 (1967).
61. See Sherman, Judicial Review of Military Deterninations and the Exbaustion of
Remedies Requirement, 55 VA. L. REv. 483, 539 (1969).
62. See A Quaker Action Group v. Hickel, 429 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1970), under
which potential demonstrators were free to use National Park Services facilities in Wash-
ington, D.C. adjacent to the White House, subject to compliance with reasonable notice
requirements; Atlanta Viet Nam Moratorium Committee v.Maddox, - F. Supp. - (N.D.
Ga. 1969), in which the court ruled, by way of declaratory judgment, that the plaintiffs,
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in the particular situation of any military installation, appropriate prece-
dents, including contemporary judicial attitudes, indicate that neither
extreme will govern. We are dealing with neither a military bastion
nor an unsupervised public area. It is evident that it is still the post
commander's prime responsibility to safeguard the security of the
United States' personnel and property. Yet, he must undertake to
balance that responsibility with rights of personal expression and free-
dom, consistent with good order and discipline and the national security.
It is, most assuredly, a delicate balance which must be determined, not
on arbitrary grounds, but upon reasonable standards consistent with his
official mission. 3
as in the case of other citizens, had equal access to the use of the State Capitol grounds for
peaceful assembly and non-violent expression of views. Note generally that parks are a
particular kind of community area that, under the Anglo-American tradition, are
available, at least to some extent and on a reasonable basis, for groups of citizens con-
cerned with expression of ideas. Women Strike for Peace v. Hickel, 420 F.2d 597, 600
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (involving the right of a peace organization to construct an anti-war
display in a national park). Cf., Koehl v. Resor, 296 F. Supp. 558 (E.D. Va. 1969),
aff'd, 417 F.2d 1338 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 90 S.Ct. 1262 (1970) (upholding the
refusal by the Secretary of the Army under the Secretary's regulations to permit
the American Nazi Party to use a national cemetery as a base for symbolic dis-
semination of its political philosophy by wearing Party uniforms and displaying Party
banners and bags while conducting a member's funeral).
63. The role of the command staff judge advocate in the military decision process
is significant. He must be prepared to furnish his commander with the necessary
legal counsel to support determinations which may be challenged in the courts.
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